Cameroon
Home ] Up ] South Africa ] Kenya ] [ Cameroon ] Nigeria ] Other countries ]

                Aloe - A hybrid that is highly adaptive to its African environmentAfriland First Bank - Creating a class of entrepreneurs in Africa A tree of the savanah - providing shade and a place to discussOffices of the Social Insurance Department in Yaonde, Cameroon - providing innovating ways to meet the needs of clientsVictoria Hospital in the old Transkei, South Africa - providing essential servicesThe Giraffe - rising above the challenges of the African landscape

Home
Up


New Workshop
Management Workshop in Cape Town April 2004

New Book
'Management and Change in Africa'

Book order information

New Projects
NGOs in Africa

MNCs in Africa

Entrepreneurship in Africa

New Resources
For the book - 'Management and Change in Africa'

 

Resources for Management and Change in Africa

 

 

Take me home

About the author of this website

 

Management and Change in Cameroon

 

Introduction

Davidson (1992) writes about the burden of the nation-state in neo-colonial Africa, as being a legacy of the political and military intrigues of the European nations through the period of imperial enclosures, and then independence. These intrigues have left behind in Cameroon a complex legacy from three colonial powers, where there are two official (European) languages and around 250 languages grouped into 24 African language groups. For most of the country the common language is French. To the west, which borders on Nigeria, the common language is English (about 10% of the population). The currency (CFA – Communaute Financiere Africaine - Franc) has in recent years been tied to the French Franc, and many of the multinational companies present in the country are French. Indeed, its main import partner is France (29% of imports) and its second export market (18%) (CIA World Factbook, 2002). Much of the political, administrative and legal systems are inherited from or modelled on the French, with just a smattering of British (World Investment News, 2002).   

 

Historical legacy and complexity

Yet Cameroon is unusual as a country whose borders were not set in stone immediately independence was won, and there is still an outstanding border dispute with Nigeria. Following the Portuguese slave trade as early as 1436, and an agreement with the British government to prohibit the slave trade in 1852, the kings and chiefs of Douala signed an assistance treaty with the German government on 12 July 1884. Two days later German sovereignty over Cameroon was proclaimed. After much local resistance to German rule, the conclusion of the First World War put an end to German occupation in 1919. In July of that year the country was partitioned by France and Britain and first administered on behalf of the League of Nations. After the Second World War the UNO granted trusteeship to France (over about 80% of the territory) and Britain. French Cameroon obtained its independence on 1 January 1960, with British Cameroon remaining under the administrative jurisdiction of the Nigerian Federation. Following a plebiscite and much protest and debate, the northern part of British Cameroon joined Nigeria, and the southern part (known as Western Cameroon) reunified with the Cameroon Republic to become the Federal Republic of Cameroon on 1 October 1961. On 20 May 1972, following a referendum, the federation structure ended, and Cameroon became a United Republic (World Investment News, 2002).

 

Ethnic complexity and demographics

This complexity of the origin of the Republic of Cameroon also overlays its ethnic complexity. Although there are some 130 ethnic groups (and around 250 languages and dialects) there are five major ones: Bamiléké and Bamoun in the west; Fulani and Kirdi in the north; and Ewondo around Yaoundé. The Bamiléké form one of the largest communities in Douala (the foremost industrial centre and port), and within the western highlands. They tend to dominate within much of the economy of Cameroon. In the rural areas there are around 80 political units ruled by independent chefferies or chiefs. Each such unit contains secret societies that are responsible for preserving traditions and rituals. The Bamoun are an exception to this, as they have a single leader or sultan (Lonely Planet, 2002). The south of the country has been in contact with Europe for more than 500 years, and Christianity is common alongside traditional beliefs. The north was part of the Muslim Fulani kingdoms until the 20th century. This has had the effect of keeping Western-style development to a minimum in the north, with main industrial developments in the south.

With a total population of 15.8 million, with the majority concentrated in the South, Cameroon has a youthful age structure in common with most Africa countries (42.37% under 15 years, and only 3.35% of the population being 65 and over: based on 2001 estimates), and a population growth rate of 2.41%. The HIV/AIDS adult prevalence rate is estimated at 7.73% with 540,000 people living with HIV/AIDS and 52,000 deaths (estimates for 1999: CIA World Factbook, 2002). The UNDP Human Development Index for 2001, which measures a country’s achievement in terms of life expectancy, educational attainment and adjusted real income, gives Cameroon a ranking of 125 (out of 162 countries). This places the country at the lower end of the medium human development countries with Kenya and Cameroon’s neighbour Republic of the Congo, and substantially higher than Nigeria (ranked 136 and in the low human development countries). Of its other neighbours, Gabon and small Equatorial Guinea do better at 109 and 110 respectively; Central African Republic and Chad do worse at 154 and 155 respectively (UNDP, 2002).

 

Economy, industry and structural reforms

Cameroon is perhaps in the unique position of being at the interface between Francophone and Anglophone sub-Saharan Africa, and at the crossroads between central and western Africa. Because of its oil resources and favourable agricultural conditions (it has one of the best-endowed primary commodity economies according to the CIA World Factbook, 2002), it is an important country to consider, not only within its immediate region, but also within sub-Saharan Africa as a whole.

However, Cameroon has largely maintained it colonial inheritance as a primary commodity producer. As Barratt-Brown (1995, p.26) puts it: ‘the colonies existed for the colonial trade; and it was in the very nature of the colonial trade that not only was wealth drawn from African produce to be spent in Europe and not in Africa, but also that most of the consumer goods in African cities had to be imported from Europe. Exports were of primary products with little or no local processing, refining or manufacturing’. Cameroon’s export concentration ratio reflects this in being a producer mainly of three primary products: oil, coffee and cocoa (Barratt-Brown, 1995, argues that most African countries’ economies, because of colonial exploitation, are built on one, two, three or four primary products which are exported, to the exclusion of building an internal consumer market), although the country has diversified more in recent years. So, although the country is a member of CEMAC (Communauté Economique et Monétaire de l’Afrique Central, formally UDEAC, comprising: Gabon, Cameroon, Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Central African Republic and Chad), which as UDEAC was founded with the aim of establishing a common external tariff and to reduce internal tariffs and promoting harmonized development policies, Cameroon’s focus is, with the other oil producer of Gabon and Congo, overwhelmingly outside Africa. Again, Barratt-Brown (1995) notes that there was a lack of projects within UDEAC to promote specialization within the region and encourage internal trade among the member countries, despite a single tax regime on products coming from within the region and a small compensation fund. The fact that all member countries are within the CFA franc zone has given some cohesion, but also a very strong outward orientation. He also adds that these countries have performed better than the sub-Saharan average for economic growth, but this is arguable due to oil revenues rather than regional cooperation (Barratt-Brown, 1995).

However, the propensity toward trade with former colonizers does not account for informal regional ‘cooperation’, perhaps a trade that has gone on noticed or unnoticed since ethnic groups were sliced in half with the advent of nation-state borders before and during independence.  An estimated US$285 million was lost to Cameroon in the late 1980s due to the smuggling of food crops into Nigeria in exchange for manufactured good (Barratt-Brown, 1995, tells of similar examples in other parts of sub-Saharan Africa).

Currently (1999 estimates: CIA World Factbook, 2002) agriculture accounts for 43.4% of GDP and 70% of the workforce; industry accounts for 20.1% of GDP and services 36.5% of GDP.  Only 13% of the workforce is estimated to be employed in industry and commerce. The 1998 estimate for unemployment is 30%.

Foreign investment declined by 72.66% between 1984 and 1998. Yet this appears to be changing as the gross investment rate in Cameroon has increased from 18.8% in 1997/8 to 20.1% in 1998/9. Construction projects play a large part in this investment, some through joint ventures within which the National Investment Company has an interest. French companies are very prominent investors, and increasingly Chinese investors have come into areas such as agricultural machinery manufacturing, and truck tyre manufacturing. Chinese investment represents about US$2 million (World Investment News, 2002)

Cameroon has a totals area of 475,442 square kilometres and a population of 15.8 million. Its GNP is US$8110 million. This, and its relative political stability compares very favourably with its neighbours Chad, Central Africa Republic, Republic of the Congo; is on par with its smaller neighbour Gabon (with 268,000 Km2; 1,125,000 million inhabitants and a GNP of US$4400 million); yet is dwarfed by Nigeria’s economy with a 114,568,100 population and GNP of US$35,680 million within an area of just over twice the size at 923,768 square kilometres.

However, its economic indicators are generally reckoned to be good with a GDP growth rate of 4.6%. Consumer price inflation was 3% for 2001, up from the previous year’s 2.1% due to higher food prices (IMF, 2002), yet considerably improved from the high of 13% immediately after the devaluation of the CFA franc by 50% in 1994. Yet it still has factors that are not conducive to developing an effective management climate. Of the 91 countries around the global that are included in Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index for 2001, it is ranked 84th alongside Azerbaijan, Bolivia and Kenya. Within Africa, only Uganda (ranked 88) and Nigeria (ranked 90) do worse. However, this Index focuses mainly on the perceived corruption of public officials (a national observatory was created in Cameroon at the end of the 1990s to fight corruption). A top-heavy civil service is seen as a major problem by the political economic orthodoxy of the IMF (see CIA Fact Book 2002). The IMF/World Bank propelled structural adjustment measures, that appear to have been adopted enthusiastically by the government, contain measures to reduce and reform the civil service and to place public enterprise into private hands.

Cameroon was the last of the sub-Saharan countries to be hit by the economic crisis of the early 1980’s. There was a fall of 20% in GNP between 1988 and 1992. In 1988 the government sought aid from the IMF and structural adjustment measures were put in place. Since then the economy has been liberalized with the abolition of non-tariff barriers and elimination of import quota, the scrapping of price harmonization and administrative control of profit margins. During the three-year programme 2000-2003 the government aims to complete its privatisation programme. The ten commercial banks in Cameroon have been privatised since 2000. Similarly the telecommunication industry (Camtel) was privatized. Other areas for privatisation include road construction, rail and air transport, the utilities, as well as agriculture. The Cameroon Development Corporation for example, which is the largest single employer after the state administration with 25,000 employees, and producing palm oil, tea, rubber and bananas, is due for privization.

 

Cameroonian Culture and Work Values

There is little information from the literature on cultural and work values in Cameroon. An exception is the work by Noorderhaven and Tidjani (2001) on African values. This compares a number of African countries, countries in other emerging areas and western countries. Cameroon is included within the African countries.

Cameroon scores relatively low on what Noorderhaven and Tidjani term Human Goodness. African countries score lower generally than western countries on this dimension. Cameroon’s score is on a par with Tanzania, lower than Ghana, yet higher than Senegal. On Rules and Hierarchy Cameroon scores highly with Tanzania and Zimbabwe. All the African countries score highly on importance of religion compared with the western countries. It is difficult to make comparison for Traditional Wisdom, as all countries score highly on this. Cameroon scores highly on Sharing, even compared with the other African countries with the exception of Senegal. Again, it has one of the higher scores for Jealousy, but has a relatively low score for Collectivism. For social responsibility Cameroon scores 0, and this may need further explanation.

Our management survey is looking at cultural differences that impact on management and change in Cameroon, and we will publish the results as soon as they are available.

 

The Management Survey

Provisional descriptive statistics for the management survey are as follows.

 

 

 

 

 

Management level 

 

Cultural Grouping

Total

Female%

Junior%

Middle%

Senior%

Cameroon

 

311

23.4

37.3(35.8)

36.6(21.2)

26.1(6.8)

 

Bassa minority

19

10.5

35.3(33.3)

29.4((0)

35.3(0)

 

Bamileki

68

18.5

44.4(32.1)

30.2(15.8)

25.4(0)

 

Beti

49

29.2

42.6(35.0)

29.8(21.4)

27.7(30.8)

 

Central minorities

26

19.2

42.3(27.3)

34.6(22.2)

23.1(0)

 

Duala/Littoral

19

26.3

31.6(33.3)

42.1(37.5)

26.3(0)

 

Hasau/Fulani/Kirdi

11

20.0

-

-

-

 

NW Anglophone

78

34.7

37.3(52.0)

41.8(28.6)

20.9(0)

 

SW Anglophone

14

25.0

16.7(50.0)

58.3(14.3)

25.0(33.3)

 

The Organization Surveys

We currently are working with a number of organizations in different sectors, and are in the process of writing up results. This page will soon be linked to case studies from Cameroon. Please revisit this page, or contact tjackson@africamanagement.org, for further information. If you have not done so already please register.

  

References

  • World Investment News (2002) www.winne.com/cameroon/report/history.htm, 05/06/2002

  • IMF (2002) International Monetary Fund Country Report No 02/32, Cameroon, Washington: IMF.

  • UNDP (2002) Human Development Report 2001, Human Development Index.

  • Barratt-Brown, M (1995) Africa’s Choices: After Thirty Years of the World Bank, London: Penguin.

  • Davidson, B. (1992) The Black Man’s Burden: Africa and the Curse of the Nation-State, Oxford: James Currey.

  • Noorderhaven, N. G. and Tidjani, B. (2001) Culture, governance, and economic performance: an exploratory study with a special focus on Africa, International Journal of Cross-cultural Management, 2001, 1(1) 31-52.

 

 

AfricaManagement.org © Terence Jackson 2002